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ABSTRACT
The advancement  and  proliferation of  wireless  local  area 
network nowadays have driven for an alarm on the whole 
network  operation.  The  concern  applies  to  both  business  
and academic computer network environments. This paper 
describes  our  research  and  experiences  in  performing 
network  vulnerabilities  analysis  in  academic  local  area  
network.  The research uses network vulnerability  analysis  
methodology to perform vulnerability analysis on Academic 
and Administration building. From the analysis, the overall  
network  security  level  can  be  determined.  Remedies  and  
solution to counter any vulnerability can also be prescribed 
and  this  will  reduce  network  vulnerability  threat  to  
academic local area network.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Wireless  technology gives  users  the  freedom of  mobility, 
gives network designers more options for connectivity, and 
gives  many  new  devices  the  capability  to  connect  to 
network. However, wireless technology brings significantly 
more  threats  or  vulnerability  than  traditional  wired 
networks.  The issue of network vulnerabilities of  wireless 
Local Area Network (LAN) is very demanding in managing 
computer  network.  With  increasing  faults  and  attacks  on 
network infrastructure,  there  is  an urgent  need to analyze 
networks and  services  vulnerabilities  under  organize  fault 
attack.
Vulnerability  is  flaw  or  weakness  in  a  system’s  design, 
implementation or operation and management that could be 
exploited (Qu et al., 2001). Network vulnerabilities refer to 
the impact of attacks and fault on computer network. It is a 
point  where  the  network  is  susceptible  to  attack.  The 
network  vulnerabilities  analysis is  systematic  examination 
of computer network to determine the adequacy of security 
measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from 
which  to  predict  the  effectiveness  of  proposed  security 
measures, and confirm the adequacy of such measures after 
implementation.
Identifying organizational  network vulnerabilities is a part 
of vulnerability risk assessment. Identifying vulnerabilities 
in enterprises can be divided into two step vulnerabilities by 
asset  and  vulnerabilities  by  class  (Myerson,  2002). 
Traditional  assets  are  consists  of  hardware,  software, 
network  and  communications,  human  resource,  facilities, 
data  mechanism,  disaster  recovery  procedures,  and 
organizational  resources.  Each  assets  have  a  different 
vulnerabilities and poses different set of test. Vulnerabilities 
by class is identified by a group of assets into classes that 
from  a  threat.  Network  vulnerabilities  analysis  (NVA) 
performs  a  systematic  test  on  the  wireless  network  to 
identify any threats.
One way of protecting the corporate information system is 
to  reduce,  mitigate  or  eliminate  the  risk of  actual  threats 
from  occurring  by  doing  some  good  risk  management 
program and  treat  it  as  number  one  priority  for  security 
policy  and  each  risk  assessment  process  consists  of  five 
variables:  assets,  threats,  vulnerabilities,  risks  and  control 
(Myerson, 2002).
2.0 WLAN VULNERABILITIES
The  security  services  are  provided  largely  by  the  Wired 
Equivalent  Privacy  (WEP)  protocol  to  protect  link-level 
data  during  wireless  transmission between clients  and the 
access  points.  WEP does not  provide  end-to-end security, 
but  only  for  the  wireless  portion  of  the  connection 
(Karygiannis & Owens, 2002).
WLANs are vulnerable and it is a good idea to follow a few 
simple tips to better protect your WLAN. Hackers are smart 
too  but  when  your  WLAN  is  protected,  they  may  get 
frustrated and give up. Key problem with existing 802.11 
are listed below (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002)
• Security features in vendor products are frequently not 
enabled - Security features, albeit poor in some cases 
are not enabled when shipped, and users do not enable 
when installed. Bad security is generally better than no 
security.
• Initial  Vector  (IV)s  are  short  (or  static)  -  24-bit  IVs 
cause the  generated  key  stream to  repeat.  Repetition 
allows  easy  decryption  of  data  for  a  moderately 
sophisticated adversary.
• Cryptographic  keys  are  short  -  40-bit  keys  are 
inadequate for any system. It is generally accepted that 
key sizes should be greater than 80 bits in length. The 
longer  the  key,  the  less  likely a  comprise  is  possible 
from a brute-force attack.
• Cryptographic keys are shared - Keys that are shared 
can compromise  a  system.  As  the  number  of  people 
sharing the key grows, the security risks also grow. A 
fundamental tenant of cryptography is that the security 
of a system is largely dependent on the secrecy of the 
keys.
• Cryptographic  keys  cannot  be  updated  automatically 
and frequently - Cryptographic keys should be changed 
often to prevent brute-force attacks.
• Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) has a weak key schedule and is 
inappropriately  used  in  WEP -  The  combination  of 
revealing 24 key bits in the IV and a weakness in the 
initial  few bytes  of  the  RC4  key  stream leads  to  an 
efficient  attack  that  recovers  the  key.  Most  other 
applications of RC4 do not expose the weaknesses of 
RC4 because  they  do not  reveal  key bits  and  do not 
restart the key schedule for every packet. This attack is 
available to moderately sophisticated adversaries
• Packet integrity is poor - Cyclic Redundancy Check 32 
(CRC32) and other linear block codes are inadequate 
for  providing  cryptographic  integrity.  Message  modi 
cation is possible. Linear codes are inadequate for the 
protection  against  advertent  attacks  on  data  integrity. 
Cryptographic  protection  is  required  to  prevent 
deliberate attacks.  Use of non-cryptographic protocols 
often facilitates attacks against the cryptography.
• No  user  authentication  occurs  -  Only  the  device  is 
authenticated.  A device  that  is  stolen  can  access  the 
network.
• Authentication is not enabled; only simple Service Set 
Identifier (SSID) identification occurs - Identity-based 
systems are highly vulnerable particularly in a wireless 
system because signals can be more easily intercepted.
• Device authentication is simple shared-key challenge-
response - One-way challenge-response authentication 
is  subject  to  “man-in  the-middle”  attacks.  Mutual 
authentication  is  required  to  provide  verification  that 
users and the network are legitimate.
• The client does not authenticate the access point (AP) - 
The client needs to authenticate the AP to ensure that it 
is legitimate and prevent the introduction of rogue APs.
According to CERT® Coordination Center the number of 
vulnerability reports rose from 171 in 1998 to 1090 by 2000 
and  633  by   first  quarter  of  2001  (Myerson,  2002). 
According  to  Fortinet  Inc’s  director,  today’s  wireless 
security standards such as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
and  Wi-Fi  protected access  (WPA) protect  the  privacy  of 
wireless  connection  via  encryption,  and  ensure  that  only 
authorized users can connect to a wireless access point but 
once connected, even if encrypted can easily deliver content 
threats  into  wired  network.  One  of  the  biggest 
communications company in country also follows the same 
step by not having a hotspot security applications in place 
because it  is a public service and users have to take their 
own security.
3.0 RELATED WORK
Mobility  that  wireless  technology  provides  has  facilitated 
some  security  vulnerabilities  and  malicious  attacks.  Even 
with good internal security practices such as firewalls and 
virus  protection,  campus  networks  are  still  vulnerable  to 
malware, since wireless access on college campuses allows 
the spread of computer viruses and worms due to laptops 
moving  between  campus  and  less-protected  networks 
(Higby & Bailey, 2004). The traditional ways of protecting 
network  for  wired  environments  are  no  longer  sufficient 
(Zhang et al., 2003).
Wireless local area networks provide a luxury of mobility to 
clients  so  that  they  may  roam  without  the  restriction  of 
wires,  room and/or  buildings.  At  the  same  time,  wireless 
local  area  networks  have  given  birth  to  a  new  breed  of 
network weaknesses that  are  compounding and exploiting 
current local area network vulnerabilities (Higby & Bailey, 
2004).
Wireless access on college campuses facilitates the spread 
of computer viruses and worms due to laptops that do not 
have  current  software  patches  and/or  antivirus  protection 
connecting to the network (Higby & Bailey, 2004).
The nature of mobile computing environment makes it very 
vulnerable to an adversary’s malicious attacks. The use of 
wireless  links  renders  the  network  susceptible  to  attacks 
ranging  from passive  eavesdropping  to  active  interfering. 
Unlike  wired  networks  where  an  adversary  must  gain 
physical  accesses  to  the  network  wires  or  pass  through 
several lines of defense at firewalls and gateways. Attack on 
a wireless network can come from all directions and target 
at  any  node.  Damages  can  include  leaking  secret 
information,  messages  contamination  and  node 
impersonation.  It  means wireless network will  not  have a 
clear line of defense, and every node must be prepared for 
encounters with an adversary directly or indirectly (Zhang 
et al., 2003).
WarDriving is “the act of moving around a specific area and 
mapping  the  population  of  wireless  access  points  for 
statistical purposes” (Hurley et al., 2005). WarDriving, also 
called  access  point  mapping,  is  the  act  of  locating  and 
possibly  exploiting  connections  to  wireless  local  area 
networks  while  driving  around  a  city  or  elsewhere.  It  is 
important  to note that the definition of  WarDriving is not 
exclusive to driving around in a car.  (Hurley et al.,  2005) 
explained that “WarDriving can be accomplished by anyone 
moving around a certain area looking for data.” People have 
“war  drived”  simply  by  walking  around  a  neighborhood 
with a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), or using a laptop 
while taking a taxi or the subway.
WarDriving is a process which an individual uses a wireless 
device such as a laptop or PDA to drive around looking for 
wireless networks (Johnson, 2005). Some people do this as 
a hobby and map out different wireless networks which they 
found. Other people,  who can be considered hackers,  will 
look for wireless networks and then break into the networks. 
If a wireless is not secure, it can be fairly easy to break into 
the network and obtain confidential information. Even with 
security, hackers can break the security and hack.
According to (Duntemann, 2003), a WarDriving is gathering 
of  statistics  about  wireless  networks  in  a  given  area  by 
listening  for  their  publicly  available  broadcast  beacons. 
Wireless access points (APs) announce their presence at set 
intervals  (usually  100  milliseconds)  by  broadcasting  a 
packet  containing  their  service  set  identifier  (SSID)  and 
several  other data items. A stumbling utility running on a 
portable computer of some sort (a laptop or PDA) listens for 
these  broadcasts  and  records  the  data  that  the  AP makes 
publicly available.
The term is the offspring of the term wardialing, which was 
the practice of dialing random phone numbers via computer 
to find an answer modem.  WarDriving  provides  a  unique 
opportunity  to  gauge  the  growth  of  a  technology  market 
segment  by  direct  inspection.  In  other  words,  we  do  not 
have  to  take  a  vendor’s  or  research  firm’s  word  for  how 
many wireless networks are out there.
It  is  important  to  understand  the  common  threats  that 
wireless network can face (Microsoft, 2006). The issues of 
vulnerabilities are explained below:
1)  Disclosure  of  data  through  eavesdropping  - 
Eavesdropping attacks on wireless traffic that is not secure 
can result in the disclosure of confidential data, discovery of 
user  credentials,  and  can  even  lead  to  identity  theft. 
Sophisticated  attackers  can  use  information  collecting  by 
eavesdropping to mount attacks on systems that would not 
otherwise be vulnerable.
2)  Interception  and  modification  of  transmitted  data  An 
attacker who can gain access to network resources is also 
capable of inserting rogue systems into a network that can 
intercept and modify data en-route between two legitimate 
systems.
3)  Spoofing  -  Access  to  an  internal  network  provides  an 
attacker with the opportunity to forge data so that it appears 
to be legitimate traffic. Such attacks can include spoofed e-
mail messages that would be trusted by internal users more 
readily  than  communications  from  outside  sources,  thus 
providing  a  platform  for  social  engineering  attacks  and 
Trojan insertions.
4)  Denial  of  services  (DoS)  -  No  matter  what  security 
solution is implemented; a WLAN is uniquely susceptible to 
DoS  attacks  whether  purposeful  or  accidental.  Such 
disruptions  can be the result of  something as simple as a 
microwave oven or  a  device  set  to  flood  a  network  with 
indiscriminate traffic.
5) Free-loading (resource theft) - Some intruders might be 
after nothing more than free access to the Internet. Though 
not  directly  malicious  or  damaging,  such  activities  can 
result in slower network connectivity for legitimate users or 
an unmanaged vector for malware test.
6)  Accidental  threats  and  unmanaged  connections  –  In 
unsecured WLAN environments any visitor can gain access 
to the internal network simply by starting up a device that is 
capable  of  accessing  wireless  networks.  Such  unmanaged 
devices could already be compromised or supply an attacker 
with vulnerable point of attack against a network.
7) Rogue WLAN access points - Even if a business has no 
wireless network it can still be vulnerable to security threats 
from unmanaged  wireless  networks.  Wireless  hardware  is 
relatively inexpensive so any employee could possibly set 
up  an  unmanaged  and  unprotected  network  within  an 
environment.
4.0 VULNERABILITIES DISCOVERY
To do WarDriving, we need a vehicle,  a computer; which 
can  be  a  laptop,  a  wireless  Ethernet  card  set  to  work  in 
promiscuous mode, and some kind of an antenna which can 
be mounted on top of or positioned inside the car. Because a 
wireless  LAN may  have  a  range  that  extends  beyond  an 
office building, an outside user may be able to intrude into 
the network, obtain a free Internet connection, and possibly 
gain access to company records and other resources.
What  most  needed  to  WarDriving  includes  the  following 
(Duntemann, 2003): A computer you can haul around with 
you. Most people use laptops. Some use PDAs based on the 
PocketPC OS or Linux.
•  A "stumbler"  utility.  By  far  the  best  known  is  Marius 
Milner’s  Network  Stumbler  for  Windows,  which  most 
people  call  NetStumbler.  Most  major  operating  systems 
have stumbler programs available. Linux has Kismet; MAC 
OS  has  MacStumbler.  Marius  has  ported  NetStumbler  to 
PocketPC, for which it’s called MiniStumbler.
• A Wi-Fi client adapter supported by your chosen stumbler 
utility.
•  An  external  antenna  attached  to  your  client  adapter. 
Ideally, this is an omnidirectional vertical mounted on the 
vehicle  roof.  These  are  small  and  resemble  cell  phone 
antennas.  We can wardrive with nothing  more  than a PC 
card’s built-in antenna, but these antennas are wretched and 
will be shielded from signals to some extent by the vehicle’s 
metal structure.
•  A Global  Positioning  System (GPS) receiver that  emits 
National  Marine  Electronics  Association  (NMEA)  183 
formatted data. This allows the stumbler program to record 
where stumbled stations are located in the physical world. 
Technically, GPS is optional, but the stumbled data is much 
less useful without GPS information.
•  Wireless  Network  Interface  Card  (Lucent  ORiNOCO 
cards recommended)
5.0 VULNERABILITIES ASSESSMENT
Wireless Vulnerabilities Assessment (WVA) can be divided 
into  two  phases  which  are  Vulnerability  Testing  and 
Vulnerability Analysis.
5.1.  Vulnerability Testing
Network  penetration  testing  means  using  tools  and 
processes  to  scan  the  network  environment  for 
vulnerabilities.  This  helps  refine  an  enterprise’s  security 
policy, identify vulnerabilities, and ensure that the security 
implementation  actually  provides  the  protection  that  the 
enterprise  requires  and  expects.  Regularly  performing 
penetration tests helps enterprises uncover network security 
weaknesses  that  can  lead  to  data  or  equipment  being 
compromised or destroyed by exploits attacks on a network, 
usually  by  “exploiting”  a  vulnerability  of  the 
system),Trojans  (viruses),  denial  of  service  attacks,  and 
other  intrusions.  Testing  also  exposes  vulnerabilities  that 
may  be  introduced  by  patches  and  updates  or  by 
misconfigurations on servers, routers, and firewalls.
5.2  Vulnerability Analysis
The  result  generated  from  the  report  is  needed  to  be 
analyzed.  The  report  provides  host  by  host  security  risk 
information  and  also  overall  security  weakness  in  the 
network. It can provide us much more detail vulnerabilities 
on  the  network.  From  the  analyzed  report,  the  overall 
conclusion  can  be  used  as  guideline  in  determine  the 
security  level  faces  by  the  organization  and  the  types  of 
remedies and prevention can be taken to secure the network.
In practice, the need for vulnerability analysis is universally 
acknowledged. Commercial vulnerability scanners are good 
at  identifying  known  vulnerabilities  in  the  software. 
However, identifying vulnerabilities is only a small part of 
securing  a  network,  and  a  significant  issue  is  identifying 
which  vulnerabilities  an  attacker  can  take  advantage  of 
through a chain of exploits. There are numerous examples 
of such chains in the research literature. In summary, each 
host  on  a  network  (hosting  services  or  client  to  network 
services, or even accessing email messages) is expected to 
expose  vulnerabilities  to  the  outside  world.  Plugging  all 
network  vulnerabilities  based  on  the  output  of  a 
vulnerability scanning tool may render a network unusable 
to bonafide users.  Hence there is a need for  vulnerability 
analysis  of  the  complete  network  (combining  all  the 
network applications  and hosts)  to chain exploits  on each 
host to find out the reach of the attacker. Such analysis is 
useful  since  it  not  only  pin  points  most  serious 
vulnerabilities  on  a  network  which  must  be  plugged,  but 
also gives a basis for decision making on the placement and 
security of valuable resources.
6.0 RESULT
Figure 1 showed the locations of every APs available.
Figure 1. GPS Map
Table I shows the summary of the data capture such as total 
of access point and ad hoc, encryption off/on, and default 
SSID.
Table 1: Data Captured
Categories No.
ALL (AP & Ad-hoc) 45
Encryption OFF 45
Encryption ON 0
Access Point 38
Ad-hoc 7
Default SSID 4
Authorize AP 29
Based on the data, total of access point were 38 units and ad 
hoc were 7 units. However, all of the numbers (access point 
and ad hoc devices) are Encryption OFF (open mode) which 
means  no  access  security  key  (password)  is  needed  and 
anybody can easily access through the access point device. 
Four access points had been detected for using default of the 
service set  identifier  (SSID).  Moreover from 45,  29 were 
legal APs and the rest were unauthorized APs (rogue AP).
7.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMM ENDATIONS
From the discussion we conclude that the vulnerabilities are 
elsewhere waiting to be manipulated. Some action should be 
taken before it is become worst.  We suggest two types of 
solution to overcome the problems: Using WPA or WPA2 
and  implementing  802.1x  Remote  Authentication  Dial  In 
User Service (RADIUS).
• Using WPA or WPA2
Instead of OPEN and Shared AP, with 100% vulnerabilities, 
the  management  should  change  to  CLOSE  AP  which 
implementing  encryption as  a  secure  access  to each  user. 
WEP is not a good choice encryptions mechanism however 
WPA/WPA2 is better as a security barrier between WLAN 
and LAN.
• Implementing 802.1X (RADIUS)
Another  option is  implementing  802.1X.  As an enterprise 
security perimeter, this option is crucial in preventing any 
unauthorized user from entering into network environment.
Placing APs without proper configuration will increase the 
vulnerabilities to network environment. During WarDriving 
session a few important factors had been found such as the 
number  of  APs  and  Ad-hoc  that  not  used  any  security 
method and several used default SSID. Some action should 
be taken aggressively to negate the problem in near future 
especially by implementing either WPA/WPA2 or 802.1X as 
the enterprise solution to prevent unauthorized user.
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